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Recent Cases
Parody of Trademarked
Products Subject to
"Likelihood of Consumer
Confusion" Standard
In Nike, Inc. v. "JUST DID IT"
Enterprises, 6 F.3d 1225 (7th Cir.
1993), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held
that reasonable minds could disagree
as to whether an individual's intended
parody of Nike, Inc.'s trademarks
would confuse consumers by leading
them to believe that Nike sponsored
the individual's product. Additionally, the Seventh Circuit determined
that a parody is not an affirmative
defense to a trademark infringement
action, but merely one factor to be
examined when determining whether
an infringement actually occurred.
The "MIKE" Parody: an
Unsuccessful Venture
Nike manufactures and markets
popular sports footwear, apparel, and
related accessories world-wide. To
identify its products, Nike developed
the word "NIKE," a "swoosh" design,
and the phrase "JUST DO IT" as its
key trademarks. Nike has spent more
than $300 million in advertising over
a 14-year period. As a result of its
marketing efforts, Nike's trademarks
are universally recognized, and have
helped the company achieve sales exceeding $10 billion since 1971.
Mike Stanard, an award-winning
commercial artist, decided to market
his first name, "MIKE," on T-shirts
and sweatshirts as a takeoff of the
"NIKE" logo. He formed "JUST DID
IT" Enterprises to carry out this new
venture. Stanard's purpose in undertaking the project was to create the
appearance from a distance that the
clothing read "NIKE" when in fact it
read "MIKE." He viewed the project
as a joke on Nike's image which has
become a social phenomenon in recent years.
Stanard marketed the T-shirts and
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sweatshirts to the general public, as
well as college athletes and celebrities named Michael. He sold his products through a small mail-order campaign. Approximately two-thirds of
those who ultimately purchased
Stanard's products were named
Michael. Nonetheless, despite
Stanard's efforts, his "MIKE" project
resulted in a financial loss.
Nike Fails to See the Humor
Nike brought an action against
Stanard in federal district court, alleging trademark infringement under the
Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C.
Sections 1114(1)(a) and 1125(a),
which prohibit trademark imitations
that confuse consumers. Trademarks
consist of words or symbols which
identify and distinguish products for
the benefit of consumers. In order to
establish a trademark infringement,
the trademark's owner must present
evidence of a valid trademark and
must show the likelihood of consumer
confusion.
Stanard argued that his humorous
play on words deserved First Amendment protection as a fair use of Nike
trademarks, claiming that he intended
to create a parody. The court acknowledged that the First Amendment
protects those who wish to ridicule
businesses seeking public recognition
through their trademarks. Such mockery may manifest itself in the form of
parody which is defined as a close
imitation of another's language and
style for the purpose of comic effect
or ridicule of the original. Stanard
further argued that his attempt to
parody Nike's trademarks was an affirmative defense to Nike's infringement allegations.
The district court rejected Stanard' s
arguments, finding that parody was
not an affirmative defense, but merely
another factor for the court to consider when determining the likelihood
of consumer confusion. Accordingly,
the district court granted Nike's motion for summary judgment, concluding that as a matter of law, the use of
the word "MIKE" would cause con-

sumer confusion. Stanard subsequently appealed the district court's
decision.
Determining the Likelihood of
Consumer Confusion
The Seventh Circuit agreed with
the district court's determination that
parody was not an affirmative defense
to a trademark infringement action,
but merely one factor in the analysis
of confusion. Therefore, the primary
issue before the court was whether
Stanard's parody was likely to confuse consumers by leading them to
believe that his products were in some
way endorsed by or affiliated with
Nike.
Traditionally, the courts have
weighed a number of nonexclusive
factors in determining whether a trademark imitation would be likely to confuse consumers. These factors include:
(1) the degree of similarity in appearance and suggestion; (2) the similarity of the products; (3) the area and
manner of concurrent use; (4) the degree of care likely to be exercised by
consumers; (5) the strength of the
complainant's trademark; (6) actual
consumer confusion; and (7) the intent of the alleged infringer to pass off
its products as those of another. Because neither Nike nor Stanard disputed the similarity of the products or
the strength and validity of Nike's
trademarks, the Seventh Circuit examined the remaining factors to determine the likelihood of consumer confusion.
The Trademarks' Similarity
In addressing the degree of similarity between Nike's trademarks and
Stanard's parody, the Seventh Circuit
determined that a jury could find that
"NIKE" and "MIKE" were not similar enough to confuse consumers.
Although the court acknowledged that
"NIKE" and "MIKE" were identical
except for one letter, it noted that a
successful parody required some duConseplication of the original.
quently, the key was not whether the
public would be confused by viewing
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the product from afar, but whether the
consumer would be confused in purchasing the product.
The Seventh Circuit also noted that
Stanard's company sold its products
through mail order and required a customer to make a check payable to
"JUST DID IT" Enterprises. Accordingly, the court found that for confusion to occur, a customer must not
only see "MIKE" as similar to "NIKE,"
but must continue to confuse the two
while making a check payable to
"JUST DID IT" Enterprises.
Stanard's Intent in Producing
"MIKE" Products
The Seventh Circuit determined
that a jury could reasonably find that
Stanard intended to amuse consumers, not confuse them, by creating a
parody of the "NIKE" trademark. The
court maintained that parodies do not
happen incidentally. Rather, a parody
results from the actual knowledge of
the trademark which the presenter,
observer, and consumer possess.
Stanard repeatedly admitted his awareness of Nike' s trademarks and asserted
that he only intended to mock Nike's
image.
Additionally, the court concluded
that the district court had erroneously
based its decision on Stanard's statement that the whole point of the parody
was to confuse observers viewing the
shirts at first glance from across the
room. The Seventh Circuit determined
that the ultimate issue was whether a
customer was confused when deciding to purchase an item, not whether a
member of the general public was
confused when viewing Stanard's
product.
Additional Factors Considered
The Seventh Circuit examined additional factors to determine the likelihood of consumer confusion. In
reviewing the marketing channels employed by "JUST DID IT" Enterprises,
the Seventh Circuit recognized that
Stanard specifically targeted an audience who would appreciate the distinction between "MIKE" and
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"NIKE." Accordingly, a jury could
conclude that Stanard's target market
would intentionally purchase a product with the "MIKE" parody, but not
the "NIKE" symbol. The court reasoned that consumers' conscious decisions would tend to show that they
were not confused as to whether Nike
endorsed Stanard's products.
The Seventh Circuit also disagreed
with the district court's conclusion
that the price of Stanard's products
suggested that consumers would not
exercise a high degree of care in making their purchases. Nike failed to
offer evidence as to the degree of care
consumers would exercise in purchasing T-shirts and sweatshirts. The court
concluded that absent such evidence,
a jury could find that customers used
care when purchasing T-shirts and
sweatshirts with different labels.
Finally, the court found that because Nike failed to provide any evidence of actual consumer confusion, a
reasonable jury could determine that
Stanard's parody was not likely to
confuse consumers. Consequently,
the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Nike and remanded the case
for further proceedings. -.
Brian K. Wydajewski

Foreign-Language
Warnings Not Required
for Nonprescription
Drugs
In Ramirez v. Plough, 863 P.2d
167 (Cal. 1993), the Supreme Court of
California held that manufacturers of
nonprescription drugs do not have a
legal duty to include foreign-language
warnings with their packaging materials.
Child Develops Reye's Syndrome
The minor plaintiff, Jorge Ramirez,
brought suit through his mother against
Plough, Inc., claiming that he developed Reye's syndrome by taking St.
Joseph Aspirin for Children (SJAC),
a nonprescription drug manufactured
by Plough. In March 1986, when
Ramirez was less than four months
old, his mother gave him SJAC to
relieve cold symptoms. Ramirez's
mother did not seek the advice of a
doctor before using SJAC, although
the label stated that for children under
two, the dosage was "as directed by
doctor." She gave Ramirez three SJAC
tablets over a two-day period. When
she took Ramirez to the hospital on
March 15, the doctor recommended
that she use nonprescription drugs that
did not contain aspirin. Ramirez's
mother, however, continued to administer SJAC. Ramirez then developed
Reye's syndrome, resulting in severe
neurological damage, including cortical blindness, spastic quadriplegia, and
mental retardation.
Reye's syndrome is a disease that
is fatal in 20 to 30 percent of cases,
with many instances of permanent
brain damage. The cause of Reye's
syndrome is still unknown, but by the
early 1980s, research demonstrated a
link between the use of aspirin during
a viral illness and the development of
Reye's syndrome. These results led
the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) to require a warning label on
aspirin products to inform parents
about Reye's syndrome. The FDA
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